It’s funny what one finds as 5 AM when online, but I happened across a blog post written about me in reference to system dynamics, and from 2010. Now regular, long-time followers of my blogs and vlogs know that I am an expert in system dynamics modeling, and even created my first startup company, Sports Business Simulations, around it. What I have learned about system dynamics modeling since I was 17 has impacted the way I look at life. And so, this fellow named Richard Veryard just happened to become an example of something I learned a long time ago: a person’s jealous desire to prove that you’re not something overcomes their ability to recognize when they’re wrong about that person.
Let me explain.
In 2010, I wrote that U.S. General Stanley McChrystal pointed to a system dynamics model diagram, this one..
This is what I blogged that seemed to have upset Richard Veryard to the point of writing a completely baseless blog post, but not contacting me to ask me what I meant. I present it in full because It originally appeared in my City Brights Blog Space in The San Francisco Chronicle from 2010. I also present it because its clear to me that Mr. Veryard made typical errors that arise when a person is, well, more interested in trying to put someone down than in trying to learn about the overall problem that attracted me to blog about what the General said about the diagram.
Here it is, in full:
Gen. Stanley McChrystal: McChrystal is not a systems thinker
Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/abraham/detail?blogid=95&entry_id=66659#ixzz0sK00vHH0
In the wake of President Barack Obama’s sacking of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who was the commander of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and due to comments in Rolling Stone magazine from McChrystal and his subordinates that were negative and derogatory toward the President and civilian military officers, an April 26, 2010 New York Times article takes on new meaning. Indeed, it should have been a indication to President Obama that he had the wrong man in charge, assuming Obama saw the article. And why is that?
Gen. Stanley McChrystal is not a systems thinker
The article has two titles, reflecting the New York Times‘ bumbling when it comes to digital media. The page title best for search is “Enemy Lurks in Briefings on Afghan War – PowerPoint – NYTimes.com, and the title on the page itself is the one most referred to: “We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint.” (As an aside, the best search-oriented title should have been “PowerPoint fails in US Afghanistan Briefing.”)
The centerpiece of the article is a giant system dynamics (or “SD”) causal relationship diagram (presented above) that shows how key factors and actions in Afghanistan are interrelated. The New York Times author apparently does not know that it’s a system dynamics model, because she does not refer to it, but to the place the SD model diagram is on: PowerPoint.
The article takes off on PowerPoint, while missing the real problem: it’s a really a model that can be ran and we can see the graph and statistical outcomes of different decisions. You need a computer and a presentation projector and a place to run the model like the platforms provided by Forio Business Simulations. Then you need to run the model and test different decisions.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal joked about the diagram
Instead of that, this is what happened according to the New York Times‘ Elisabeth Bumiller:
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the leader of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, was shown a PowerPoint slide in Kabul last summer that was meant to portray the complexity of American military strategy, but looked more like a bowl of spaghetti. “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war,” General McChrystal dryly remarked, one of his advisers recalled, as the room erupted in laughter.
The simple fact that McChrystal didn’t understand the slide is why we’re not only not winning the war, but not seeing that we should not be in Afghanistan. The seeds of the reasons why are actually in the system dynamics model. If Gen McChrystal understood systems thinking, and then system dynamics, he would have asked for a computer to run the model, rather than joke about a picture.
If he did, he would have seen a the impact of the part of the model called “Popular Support.” One of the key factors in that variable area is something that is just called “anger” with both the US Government and the Afghan Government.
The idea is that by the government helping the economy and infrastructure, this anger is reduced. But then insurgents destroying that same infrastructure harm this effort. So what happens if you just took the US Government out of the picture? In other words, just remove “Coalition Capacity and Priorities”, which would cause the elimination of “Coalition Domestic Support” and we remove the factor the Afghan population’s reacting to in the model: the United States.
The problem with the model is it’s designed to show how US and Coalition forces can impact Afghanistan, but then it implies our very existence in the region is pissing some of them off, causing a set of problems that we have to spend money to deal with.
If you want to see a one version of a simple type of the same SD diagram that takes you through how the factors are related, here’s a model created by Chris Soderquist for the IEE Systems Thinking Blog and Forio Business Simulations and presented in a blog post called “We have met an ally and it is storytelling“:
(Alternatively, use this link for the model.)
If Gen. McChrystal knew systems thinking, and were honest, he’d realize the best course of action is not to be in Afghanistan. Of course, if Gen. McChrystal were a systems thinker, he would not have got himself into the trouble that cost him his job.
And From That, Richard Veryard Halls Off On Me In His Blog Post In 2010
For reasons that really add up to Richard Veryard wanting to defend Gen. McChrystal after he was sacked by President Obama, he writes a post that completely skips over what you just read, and extends into fantasy, all to try and prove that I am wrong about Gen. McChrystal. The bottom line is that Gen. McChrystal does not know system dynamics, did not know it then, and did not care to know it.
Richard writes:
...There is an important distinction between systems thinking as a theoretical exercise and systems practice as a way of engaging with complex reality. From the latter perspective, it makes a lot of sense to see “understanding the slide” and “winning the war” as inextricably linked. For a practical systems thinker, the only authentic way to learn more about highly complex systems is to engage with them. (This is a critical element of what we call “next practice”.)
But here’s where Richard screws up: the discussion was about the system dynamics diagram and what Stanley said. If Gen.Stanley McChrystal was a systems thinker, then he would have at least tried to mate his experience in the region with what the model presented. He would have tried to at least be familiar with the mental models that were used to form the SD model of concern. But Gen.Stanley McChrystal did not do that – he just dismissed it.
In an effort to disagree with me, Richard Veryard threw pesky details to the wind. Since they matter, particularly in the modeling of complex systems, Richard was wrong before he finished. The simple next proof is in the “And maybe General McChrystal just doesn’t like this particular diagram” blast. Since the General has no background in system dynamics, how the heck is one to think he’s going to like or dislike any system dynamics model. He responded like many have done with system dynamics in my experience. He dismissed it as hard to understand.
Occam’s Razor: entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. In other words, Richard should not try and invent reasons for what Stanley McChrystal did beyond evidence to prove it. There was none. Stanley McChrystal did not want to learn system dynamics or systems thinking. Since that’s true, then I can refer to what he would do if he did know system dynamics and was a true practitioner of systems thinking. In fact, he proves my point by writing this page where he basically blasts the foundations of system dynamics modeling of complex systems, even though he does not mention SD by name. The short of it is “why do it because its going to be wrong, anyway.”
Now, Let’s Get To The Real Issue, OK?
Richard’s expression of jealously caused him to jump over the real matter at hand: why we got out of that place. Ok, hind-sight is 20-20, but this really is 20-20.
What I wrote above, which I copy here:
The idea is that by the government helping the economy and infrastructure, this anger is reduced. But then insurgents destroying that same infrastructure harm this effort. So what happens if you just took the US Government out of the picture? In other words, just remove “Coalition Capacity and Priorities”, which would cause the elimination of “Coalition Domestic Support” and we remove the factor the Afghan population’s reacting to in the model: the United States.
The problem with the model is it’s designed to show how US and Coalition forces can impact Afghanistan, but then it implies our very existence in the region is pissing some of them off, causing a set of problems that we have to spend money to deal with.
In other words, the model was quite right. We wound up getting out because of that and we did cause a set of problems that we’re spending money to deal with to this day. In retrospect, we should have fashioned a slow-leave and make sure economic and infrastructure aid remained.
The problem we’re spending money to deal with involves getting Americans out of that country. We have 200 over there, still. Moreover (and probably by not using system dynamics modeling) we did not see the dangers of fashioning a rapid leave from the region. The action was, literally, a shock to the system that was in place for so many years. There was no model of what “steady state” looks like, so we did not see the reaction to our leaving (in other words interrupting the system) coming.
So, that concludes my response to a post that I happened to see, some 11 years later. I wonder what the real motivation for Richard Veryard’s clumsy response to my original post was?
Stay tuned.